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D uring the period of early history, through the Biblical days, the Egyptian, Greek, and Roman empires, and the Crusades, and well into the Middle 
Ages, there was no protection for individuals taken prisoner in conflict and they 
were either killed or enslaved. It was not until well into the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries that it began to be accepted that prisoners of war were 
merely unfortunate human beings who were being held in custody solely to 
prevent them from once again engaging in the hostilities.! While this resulted 
in some bilateral agreements touching on the subject, the first multilateral 
attempt to legislate in this area was Chapter II of the Regulations Attached to 
the 1899 Hague Convention No. II on the Laws and Customs of War on Land,2 
a document containing 17 articles with respect to prisoners of war. The 17 
articles of Chapter II of the Regulations Attached to the 1907 Hague 
Convention No. IV on the Laws and Customs of War on Land3 were, for all 
practical purposes, identical to those of 1899. The provision of these two 
instruments most relevant to our discussion is Article 4(2) which provides that: 
"They [i.e., prisoners of war] must be humanely treated." Although these 
Conventions had no penal provisions as such, after both World War I and World 
War II individuals were tried and convicted for what amounted to violations of 
h . .. 4 t elr provlSlons. 
During the course of World War I the provisions of the 1907 Hague IV 
Convention relating to the protection of prisoners of war were found to be so 
inadequate that a great number of bilateral and multilateral agreements on the 
subject were drafted and entered into by the opposing belligerents.5 Then in 
1929, as an aftermath of World War I, the International Committee of the Red 
Cross (the ICRC), which had previously been concerned solely with the sick 
and wounded of armed forces in the field and at sea, entered the prisoner-of-war 
arena by sponsoring the 1929 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment 
of Prisoners of War6; and World War II was followed by four new 
ICRC-sponsored conventions, the third of which was the 1949 Geneva 
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Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. 7 It is with this 1949 
Third Geneva Convention that we will be primarily concerned.8 In view of the 
breadth of the subject-matters covered by the 1949 Geneva Convention 
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, this discussion will be limited 
to the provisions relevant to "deterring humanitarian law violations" and to 
h " h· nfc " fh .. 9 t ose strengt enmg e orcement 0 t ose provlSlons. 
First, some statistics: as of31 December 1995 there were 185 members of the 
United Nations. At that same time, there were 186 States Parties to the 1949 
Geneva Conventions. The only members of the United Nations, or Parties to 
the Statute of the International Court of Justice, who were not Parties to these 
Conventions were Eritrea, Lithuania, Marshall Islands, and Nauru.10 The near 
universality of these conventions is obvious and it is probably not an exaggeration 
to say that they are now part of the customary law of war, binding on all nations, 
whether or not they are Parties thereto. 
There are a number of articles of the 1949 Third Geneva Convention which 
are worthy of mention in the context of our study as they establish either the 
coverage of the Convention or the substantive humanitarian rule which is to be 
followed. Thus, Article 1 is short and to the point: "The High Contracting 
Parties undertake to respect and to ensure respect for the present Convention 
in all circumstances." Note that not only does a Party itself undertake to respect 
the provisions of the Convention, it is responsible for ensuring respect thereof 
by its people, civilian and military, and by other Parties, including the belligerents 
when it is a neutral and its allies when it is a co-belligerent. This latter is not 
always an easy task, as the United States learned in Vietnam. 
Article 2 specifies when the Convention is applicable. First, it is applicable 
in all cases of declared war or of any other anned conflict which may arise between 
two or more of the High Contracting Parties even if the state of war is not 
recognized by one of themY 
The latter part of this provision has increased in importance because of the 
fact that although there have been more than a hundred international armed 
conflicts since the end of World War II, there have been no declarations of war 
since that of the Soviet Union against Japan in August 1945 and there have, 
therefore, been no formal acts recognizing the existence of a state of war. 
Second, the Convention is applicable in the case of a military occupation, 
even if that occupation is not resisted; and, third, the general participation (si 
omnes) clause of the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions is specifically rejected 
and the Convention is applicable as between States Parties thereto even if one 
of the belligerents is not a Party to the Convention. In view of the \vide 
acceptance of this Convention, this provision, which was of major importance 
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when adopted, hasJost that status. Its importance when drafted is evidenced by 
the fact that in his 1948 dissent in the trial of the major Japanese war criminals 
by the International Military Tribunal for the Far East,Justice Pal ofIndia found 
that during World War II in the Pacific Japan was not bound by the rules set 
forth in the 1907 Hague Convention No. IV and its annexed Regulations 
because Bulgaria and Italy were not Parties to that Convention.12 
Article 4 of the 1949 Third Geneva Convention is an extremely lengthy 
article which specifies the numerous classes of individuals who are entided to 
prisoner-of-war status when they fall into the power of the enemy. For the 
purposes of the present study it may be assumed that at the time of the alleged 
violation of the humanitarian provisions of the Convention the victims were 
prisoners of war and that at the time of the prosecution for that alleged violation 
of the humanitarian provisions of the Convention, the accused were entided to 
the status of prisoners of war. 13 
Article 5 has two very important provisions. Its first paragraph provides that 
the Convention is applicable "from the time they [i.e., persons entided to 
prisoner-of-war status] fall into the power of the enemy until their final release 
and repatriation." The North Koreans and the Chinese Communists in Korea 
contended that a prisoner of war was not entided to the benefits of the 
Convention until he had "repented"-which meant that he had accepted 
Communist indoctrination14; and the North Vietnamese contended that, 
although no American prisoners of war had been tried, they were all war 
criminals captured in flagrante delido and, therefore, were not entided to the 
protection of the Convention.1S Neither of these contentions was legally valid. 
Moreover, the second paragraph of that article specifically provides that if there 
is a dispute as to the entidement to prisoner-of-war status, the individual is 
entided to the protection of the provisions of the Convention until his status 
has been determined by a competent tribunal. No such determinations were 
made in either North Korea or North Vietnam, but prisoners of war held by 
those entities were denied the protection of the provisions of the Convention.16 
Article 8 is concerned with the operations of the Protecting Power, the 
neutral Power which represents a belligerent in the territory of its enemy and 
which has the very important responsibility of ensuring that prisoners of war 
receive the humane treatment and other protections to which they are entided 
under the provisions of the 1949 Third Geneva Convention. A Protecting 
Power is selected by the belligerent which it is to represent and it must be 
acceptable to the belligerent in whose territory it is to operate. While most 
belligerents had Protecting Powers during World War II, the 1982 Falklands 
War is the only real instance of the designation, acceptance, and functioning of 
Protecting Powers during hostilities since 1949 despite the great number of 
international wars which have occurred since that time.17 This is, indeed, a 
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tragedy, as the mere existence of a Protecting Power is frequently sufficient to 
ensure more humane treatment for prisoners of war. 
Article 9 provides that nothing in the Convention is to be considered as 
adversely affecting the humanitarian activities of the ICRC, or of any other 
impartial humanitarian organization, which activities are, however, subject to 
the consent of the belligerent concerned. In Korea the ICRC was allowed to 
perform its normal functions of inspecting prisoner-of-war camps, consulting 
individual prisoners of war, providing relief supplies, etc., by the United Nations 
Command in South Korea, but it was not permitted to function in North Korea. 
In Vietnam the ICRC was allowed to perform its normal functions in South 
Vietnam, but it was not permitted to function in North Vietnam. During the 
hostilities in Vietnam one well-known academic took the position that an 
anti-war group of which he was a member was such an "impartial humanitarian 
,organization. ,,18 The present author strongly challenged that conclusion.19 
During the Iran-Iraq War there were not only no Protecting Powers, but both 
countries frequently denied the International Committee of the Red Cross 
access to its prisoner-of-war camps. Eventually, the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations sent a special mission to inspect the prisoner-of-war camps in 
both countries and numerous violations of the provisions of the 1949 Third 
Geneva Convention were found to have been committed by both sides.20 
The 1949 Third Geneva Convention contains a number of substantive 
provisions which define certain inhumane conduct towards prisoners of war as 
punishable. Thus, Article 13 provides: 
Any unlawful act or omission by the Detaining Power causing death or seriously 
endangering the health of a prisoner of war in its custody is rrohibited and will 
be regarded as a serious breach of the present Convention. 1 In particular, no 
prisoner of war may be subjected to physical mutilation or to medical or scientific 
experiments of any kind which are not justified by the medical, dental or hospital 
fth . d d . d . hi . 22 treatment 0 e pnsoner concerne an came out m s Interest. 
Likewise, prisoners of war must at all times be protected, particularly against acts 
of violence and against insults and public curiosity. 23 
Measures of reprisal against prisoners of war are prohibited.24 
And Article 130 states: 
Grave breaches to which the preceding Article relates shall be those involving any 
of the following acts, if committed against persons or property protected by the 
Convention: wilful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, including biological 
experiments, wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health, 
compelling a prisoner of war to serve in the forces of the hostile Power, or wilfully 
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depriving a prisoner of war of the rights of fair and regular trial prescribed in this 
Convention?5 
These two articles refer specifically to serious or grave breaches of the 
provisions of the 1949 Third Geneva Convention.16 Article 129(1) of that 
Convention requires States Party "to enact legislation necessary to provide 
effective penal sanctions for persons committing, or ordering to be committed, 
any of the grave breaches" defined in Article 130. Based upon the precedents 
of post-World War II, this provision was unnecessary. A violation of a 
prohibitive provision of a law-of-war convention is a war crime; a war crime is 
punishable as a violation of international law; the punishment to be assessed for 
the commission of a war crime is within the discretion of the trial court.27 Article 
129(3) requires each State Party to take measures for the punishment of all 
violations of the 1949 Third Geneva Convention other than the grave breaches. 
Thus, violations of other provisions of the Convention such as, for example, 
those contained in Articles 14, 16, 17,23,26,34,52, etc., are likewise punishable 
offenses, although the international community considers them to be on a lesser 
level of importance than violations of the provisions of Articles 13 and 130.18 
There will be little difficulty in identifying the acts which constitute violations 
of the substantive provisions of the 1949 Third Geneva Convention. 
Unfortunately, the procedural provisions of that Convention, while easily 
identified, may present some problems of application. 
Articles 82-88 and 99-107 set forth rules which are intended to ensure that 
any prisoner of war who is subjected to a judicial proceeding by the Detaining 
Power, whether for a pre-capture or a post-capture offense, will receive a fair 
trial. Most of those provisions should cause no difficulty of implementation. 29 
However, there are two which will. 
Article 63 of the 1929 Geneva Prisoner-of-War Convention provided: 
A sentence shall only be pronounced on a prisoner of war by the same tribunals 
and in accordance with the same procedure as in the case of persons belonging to 
the anned forces of the detaining Power. 
In the Yamashita Case30 the United States Supreme Court held that this 
provision was directed at post-capture offenses only and did not apply to trials 
for pre-capture offenses (war crimes). This ruling was followed by all of the 
courts before which the issue was raised in the war crimes cases tried after World 
War II with the result that those cases were not tried by courts-martial, but by 
military tribunals, military commissions, and other specially established courts, 
each with its own rules concerning procedure and, particularly, the admission 
f ·d 31 o eVl ence. 
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Apparendy the participants in the Diplomatic Conference which drafted the 
1949 Third Geneva Convention desired to make its provisions applicable to 
pre-capture, as well as post-capture, offenses. To accomplish this end they 
included in that Convention Article 102 which, for all practical purposes, is 
identical with Article 63 of the 1929 Geneva Prisoner-of-War Convention; then 
they drafted a new provision to be found in Article 85 of the 1949 Third Geneva 
Convention, which states: 
Prisoners of war prosecuted under the laws of the Detaining Power for acts 
committed prior to capture shall retain, even if convicted, the benefits of the 
C . 32 present onventJ.on. 
It would appear that the draftsmen were attempting to provide that when 
prisoners of war are tried for pre-capture offenses, that is, for war crimes, they 
would, in accordance with the provisions of Article 102, be entided to be tried 
"by the same courts according to the same procedure as in the case of members 
of the armed forces of the Detaining Power" -which means that the draftsmen 
of the Convention were adopting a rule contrary to that laid down in the 
Yamashita Case?3 Of course, such trials could still be conducted by military 
commissions or other specially created tribunals-but only if members of the 
armed forces of the Detaining Power could be tried by such commissions or 
·b al 34 tn un s. 
There is one possible view of Article 85 of the 1949 Third Geneva 
Convention which might result in its being interpreted differendy. As we have 
seen, that article refers to prisoners of war "prosecuted under the laws of the 
Detaining Power." When a prosecution is for a violation of a provision of the 
1949 Third Geneva Convention, is it based on "the laws of the Detaining 
Power" or is it based on international law? The International Committee of the 
Red Cross urges very strongly that such a prosecution is based on national law, 
particularly for a country like the United States where treaties are part of the 
supreme law of the land.35 On the other hand, it is often argued: (1) that the 
post-World War II war crimes trials established the precedent that war crimes 
were and are violations of international law; (2) that it would be difficult to find 
a national statute which, for example, prohibited compelling a prisoner of war 
to serve in the forces of the Capturing Power, or the denial of quarter, or the 
use of prisoner-of-war labor in a munitions factory; and (3) that the fact that 
Article 99 of the 1949 Third Geneva Convention prohibits the trial of a prisoner 
of war for an act not "forbidden by the law of the Detaining Power or by 
International Law,,,36 while Article 85 of that Convention refers only to "the 
laws of the Detaining Power," indicates that the draftsmen did not intend 
prosecutions under international law to be covered by the provisions of Article 
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85 and that, therefore, the decision in the Yamashita Case, and like cases, 
continues to apply. This appears to be a problem of interpretation which will 
only be resolved when courts are actually presented with the problem?7 
It is apparent that in any future war crimes trials there will be little opportunity 
to advance the contention that the offense charged is subject to the claim of 
being ex post facto; and that, under the post-war situation which normally 
prevails, prosecutions in common law countries will be much more difficult to 
conduct if there must be compliance with the strict common law rules of 
evidence. However, all in all, it may certainly be said that while some of the 
provisions of the 1949 Third Geneva Convention are intended to protect the 
helpless prisoner of war from unfair prosecutions, the specific aim of many of 
those provisions is to "deter humanitarian law violations" and to "strengthen 
enforcement" of the substantive provisions thereo£ 
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